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TRANSACTION COSTS AND CATTLE FARMERS’ CHOICE OF MARKETING 




About 70% of the Namibian population depends on agricultural activities for their livelihood. 
Moreover, agriculture remains an important sector to Namibia because its national economy 
is widely dependent on agricultural production. Cattle producers in the Northern Communal 
Areas (NCAs) have an option to market their cattle via the formal or informal markets. 
Efforts have been made to encourage producers to market their cattle through the formal 
market; however, limited improvement has been observed. In this study a number of factors 
have been analysed to determine its influences on cattle marketing decisions. Factors 
influencing the marketing decision of whether or not to sell through the formal market are 
analysed using the Probit model. Factors influencing the proportion of cattle sold through the 
formal market on condition that a producer uses the formal markets to sell cattle are analysed 
with the Truncated model. Testing the Tobit model against the alternative of a two-part 
model is done using Cragg’s model. Empirical results revealed that problems with transport 
to MeatCo, improved productivity, accessibility to market-related information and access to 
new information technology, are some factors significantly affecting the decision of whether 
or not to sell through the formal market. Payment arrangements by MeatCo, animal handling, 
accessibility to new information technology, age of respondents and lack of access to 
marketing expertise, are some factors influencing the proportional number of cattle sold 
through the formal market. The results suggest that substantially more information is 
obtained by modelling cattle marketing behaviour as a two decision-making instead of a 
single decision-making framework.  
 




1.  Introduction  
 
Strengthening agriculture is critical for facing the challenges of rural poverty, food insecurity, 
unemployment and sustainability of natural resources. World Bank (2007) points out that 
agriculture can work in conjunction with other sectors to produce faster growth, reduce 
poverty and sustain the environment. However, there is a need for promoting market 
participation to increasingly recognize the efforts of bringing about agricultural 
transformation in developing countries (Alene et al, 2007).  
 
Currently, some 70% of Namibia’s population derive their livelihoods from agriculture, 
either directly or indirectly (Horsthemke, 2009). The trend in the adoption of new technology 
in agricultural production and management has been termed the industrialization of 
agriculture (Cuthbert, 2008). Therefore, for Namibia to progress to a higher level of food 
security and indeed production for export, development of the sector is critical to accelerate 
the industrialization of agriculture.  
 
As a semi-arid country well endowed with natural pastures, Namibia is suited for extensive 
livestock ranching (Ouseb, 2006). Historically, livestock from the commercial farming sector 
has dominated agricultural production in Namibia and this largely still holds true. Cattle, 
sheep and goats constituted about 80% of overall agricultural output in 2006 (Hosthemke, 
2009). 
 
The primary aim of this paper is to investigate the factors that influence the marketing 
behaviour of cattle producers in the NCAs to get an understanding of the factors restricting 
them to use formal marketing channels to market their cattle. In order to reach this primary 
objective, the following secondary objectives must be reached; firstly to determine the factors 
that influence producers’ choice on whether or not to use the formal marketing channel; 
secondary to determine the factors that influence the proportion of cattle marketed through 
the formal markets on condition that a producer has used the formal markets to sell 
his/her cattle; lastly, to formally test whether it is sufficient to model marketing behaviour as 
a single decision as done by other researchers or should the marketing decision be separated  
into a two decision-making framework. 
 
In the next section, the problem statement is given which is further supported by the literature 
review in section three. The fourth section provides more insight in the data used, as well as 
the methodology employed. The results are presented in the fifth section, while conclusions 




2. Problem statement 
 
Düvel (2001) states that, because of the Veterinary Cordon Fence (VCF), livestock producers 
in the NCAs are particularly disadvantaged as far as livestock marketing is concerned. Meat 
and livestock cannot pass freely through this VCF into the southern Foot-and- Mouth Disease 
(FMD) free zone. This complicates the marketing of livestock. To overcome this barrier, the 
government of Namibia established MeatCo in 1992 and built eleven quarantine facilities in 
the NCAs (FAO & NEPAD, 2005). MeatCo abattoirs in NCAs were established with the aim 
of creating marketing opportunities for communal producers in the NCAs to benefit from 
their livestock through the formal market.  
 
Cattle owners in the NCAs of Namibia are able to sell their animals to the informal
4 or 
indigenous market, or they can sell to the government-owned parastatal, MeatCo (De Bruyn 
et al, 2001). For producers in the NCAs to market their cattle to the formal markets 
(MeatCo), it is a prerequisite that their cattle have to be kept in quarantine camps for 
inspection of any disease for at least 21 days before meat products enters the South of the 
Veterinary Cordon Fence (SVCF) or South African market. A problem associated with this is 
that transaction costs involved in the marketing of cattle is high in the formal markets 
because these cattle often lose condition (i.e. weight and grading in the quarantine camps due 
to insufficient feed causing low prices (Kirsten, 2002; FAO & NEPAD, 2005; Doss et al, 
2005; NASSP, 2005) as well as due to long distances producers have to transport animals to 
quarantine camps (Sartorius von Bach, 1990; Arbik & Vigne, 2002; NOLIDEP, 2002).  
 
Kruger and Lammerts-Imbuwa (2008) argue that the off-take rate of cattle through formal 
markets in NCAs, remain low at 2% compared to about an estimated 20% off-take for the rest 
of the country. Research has been done on this problem; however, most researchers consider 
marketing decision as a single decision. No one has considered that different factors may 
influence the decisions of cattle marketing, thus the two decisions need to be modelled 
separately: (i) the decision of whether or not to use the formal markets, (ii) the proportion of 
cattle sold through the formal markets given the condition that they have decided to use the 
formal markets to sell their cattle. An assumption of being a single decision while it actually 
may be two separate decisions, may cause the focus to fall on factors that are not really 
contributing to convince producers to market their cattle through formal markets.  
 
3. Literature review 
 
3.1 Livestock production and marketing in Namibia 
 
Appendix A shows that 61% of all cattle population is found on the communal areas of which 





communal areas, just over 65% of all goats are found in communal areas (Kruger  & 
Lammerts-Imbuwa, 2008). 
 
Namibia is an ideal cattle ranching country and its beef products have long been taste-
preferred favourites world-wide (Nevil, 2004). It is observed that per capita daily calorie 
intake from beef in Namibia is twice as much Kenya’s, nine times as much as Nigeria’s and 
almost equal to Canada’s (Christian Science Monitor, 2008).  
 
Cattle bought by MeatCo from NCAs regions of Kunene north, the Northern Central Regions 
and the Kavango Region are slaughtered at the Oshakati abattoir, while cattle from Caprivi 
region are slaughtered at the Katima Mulilo abattoir. MeatCo’s Oshakati abattoir, which is 
being supplied with cattle by producers from North Central Regions (NCRs), with a slaughter 
capacity of 280 cattle per day, operates at only 40% capacity (FAO & NEPAD, 2005). Shown 
in Appendix B are the cattle marketing figures in NCAs, export abattoirs, butchers and South 
Africa.  
 
3.2 Transaction costs economics and communal livestock production 
 
Livestock and meat products have been among the fastest growing components of the global 
agriculture and food industry (Morgan & Tallard, 2006; SARD & Livestock, 2007). 
Moreover, livestock systems are characterized by long marketing chains featuring great 
distances, numerous phases of weight gain and feeding regimes, multiple levels of traders and 
transactions, a multitude of steps and stages of processing, and a variety of employment-
creating services and inputs (Rich et al, 2009). 
Pingali et al (2005) states that with small-scale farmers there are difficulties hindering them 
to commercialisation, these hindrances arise from lack of public goods that hamper market 
exchange as well as from a new set of transaction costs that emerged from dealing with the 
food system. Matungul  et al, (2001) and Alene et al (2007) explains that smallholders in 
Africa often face high transaction costs in production and marketing of agricultural outputs 
owing to the nature of their products and the institutional environment in which they have to 
operate. In the African context, transportation infrastructures are a common bottleneck to 
increase intra-regional trade. Furthermore, inadequate market information flows and high 
illiteracy among market operators are hampering livestock marketing (Iimi, 2007). 
Transaction costs had different meanings to different groups of people thus all risks had to be 
understood within the larger social, cultural and economic context (Doss et al, 2005). 
3.3 Definition of transaction costs 
 
There is no standard definition of the term ‘transaction costs’ with various references 
defining it differently. Singh (2004) explains that the term can be broadly interpreted to 
include costs associated with market exchange, including costs of searching for options, 
negotiating contracts and enforcing agreements. Hobbs (1997) and Matungul et al (2001) 
define ‘transaction costs’ as the costs involved in exchange or trade (e.g. marketing costs), 
costs of intangibles (e.g. search for exchange partners), contract monitoring and enforcement. 5 
 
Walter and Boeckenstedt  (2007)  define transaction cost as logistic costs, including cash 
payments and amortized costs associated with post-production handling, packaging, storage, 
inventory carrying and transportation. Pingali et al (2005) and Alene et al (2007) define 
transaction cost as the embodiment of barriers to market participation by resource-poor 
smallholders and have been used as a definitional characteristic of smallholders and as factors 
responsible for significant market failures in developing countries.  
 
3.4 Transaction cost theory 
 
Chen  et al, (2006) recommends that transaction cost is a viable theory to explain the 
acquisition decision in marketing channels. Musemwa et al, (2008) explains that transaction 
costs are considered as barriers to the efficient participation of producers in different markets. 
Thus, producers will not use a particular channel when value of using that channel is 
outweighed by the costs of using it (Musemwa et al, 2008). Transaction costs, which are 
distinct from physical marketing costs such as those for transport and storage, arise from the 
coordination of exchange among market actors (Eleni & Gabre-Madhin, 2001). De Bruyn et 
al,  (2001) argue that market transactions do not occur in a frictionless environment. 
Transaction costs are economically equivalent to frictions in physical systems (MacInnis, 
2004). Jabbar (2008) and  Eleni and Gabre-Madhin (2001), explain that transaction costs are 
unique and specific to individual agents, therefore, each agent in the market conducts 
transactions on the basis of his/her own costs.   
Hobbs (1996) argues that economic agents face costs in the search for information about 
products, prices, inputs and buyers or sellers. The costs of obtaining price information depend 
on the extent to which there is readily available information on market prices (Hobbs, 1997). 
Crase and Dollery (1999) argues that the limitations of human beings may be such that they 
lack the skills, knowledge or intelligence to process information on products even within a 
bounded rationality framework. Hence the more time and energy spent on searching for 
market information, the higher the information cost (Gong et al, 2007). Households living in 
places where roads are impassable may not have easy access to up-to-date information about 
the markets and market prices (Nkhori, 2004).  
 
Negotiation costs arise from the physical act of the transaction and are influenced by the way 
in which the transaction is carried out. Hobbs (1996) gives an example that the opportunity 
cost of the time that procurement staff takes to locate supplies of cattle, is a negotiation cost. 
Acharya (2006) observe that the long travel distances involved to reach a market is a 
disincentive for most producers, with small surplus to sell. When the condition of the roads is 
poor, transporters increase fees to compensate for damages to their vehicles emanating from 
the use of such roads (Dovie & Shackleton, 2003). 
It may be necessary to monitor the quality of goods from a supplier or to monitor the 
behaviour of a supplier (or buyer) to ensure that all pre-agreed terms of the transaction are 
complied with (Hobbs, 1996). Producers may accrue the monitoring costs in ensuring that the 
cattle are handled correctly during transportation to the quarantine camp and to the buyer 
premises. If there is a concern among buyers that the cattle are highly stressed or have been 6 
 
bruised as a result of additional handling and transportation, they may discount the prices that 
they are prepared to pay for cattle. 
Chen et al (2006) explains that human nature and the environment of exchange can cause 
market failure due to unacceptably high transaction costs in transaction processes; differences 
in the character of exchange level such as uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity can 
influence the transaction cost. Gong et al (2007) observes that, when selling live animals 
directly to processors, cattle producers may face great  uncertainty, which is determined only 
after the animal has been slaughtered. It may be impossible for a farmer to distinguish 
whether the reason for the low price is due to random shocks to the supply or demand 
function and to know what to do differently next time (Grosh, 1994).  
 
3.5 Reducing high transaction costs 
 
The use of IT can dramatically increase the ability to share information, and this affects the 
economics of private and public provision of information goods and services. Singh (2004) 
argues that IT can significantly reduce the high transaction costs that poor consumers face as 
this can have a long-lasting positive impact on economic development. A study on 
transaction costs and market efficiency done by Gu (2001) observes that as transaction costs 
decline, individuals increase their use of the market, which results in an increase in overall 
degree of ignorance of the individuals that access the markets directly. 
3.6 Related research 
 
Gong et al (2007) used the model to examine key factors that affect cattle farmers’ selection 
of marketing channels and draw implications for China’s beef supply chain development. 
Hobbs (1997) measures the importance of transactions costs in cattle marketing in US by 
using a Tobit model whereas MacInnis (2003) measures transaction costs and organic 
marketing (Corn and Soybeans) in US by applying the same model. However, these 
researchers modelled decision with the Tobit model assuming it in a single-decision 
framework without considering that this model is very restrictive. Lin and Schmidt (1983) 
detect a problem with the Tobit as it links the shape of the distribution of the positive 
observations and the probability of a positive observation. They further state that the shape of 
the distribution of the positive observations would have to resemble the extreme upper tail of 
a normal, which would imply a continuous and faster than exponential decline in density as 
one moved away from zero. Conversely, when zero occurs less than half of the time, the 
Tobit model necessarily implies a non-zero mode for the non-zero observations (Lin and 
Schmidt, 1983). According to Zhang et al (2006), the Tobit model has been shown to be 
inadequate to characterize the two processes in market behaviour.  
Bellemare and Barret (2005) presented an ordered Tobit estimator, a two-stage econometric 
model determining marketing behaviour, highlighting the implications of different 
assumptions about households’ (discrete) participation and (continuous) volume decision: 
evidence from Kenya and Ethiopia. Ehui, et al (2009) applied a two-step procedure to 
provide an empirical basis for identifying options to increase participation and sales of 7 
 
smallholder producers in livestock markets in Ethiopia. However, these researchers did not 
test whether it is sufficient to model the analysis as a double-hurdle model. 
The contribution of this paper, apart from using a double-hurdle model to (i) determine the 
factors that influences producers’ choice on whether or not to use the formal marketing 
channel and to (ii) determine the factors that influence the proportion of cattle marketed 
through the formal markets, a formal testing of whether it is sufficient to model the analysis 
as a single decision-making or as a two decision-making is done using Cragg’s model. Hence, 
making it the first of its kind applied in the livestock marketing behaviour according to the 
knowledge of the researcher. 
4. Data and methodology 
 
A structured questionnaire was used to obtain primary data. Four regions (Omusati, Oshana, 
Ohangwena and Oshikoto) were sampled. The survey was conducted from June 2009 to 
August 2009 with 121 respondents from the four selected regions.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the explanatory variables that are hypothesized to have an influence in 
the decision-making of whether or not to sell through the formal markets. A brief description 
of each variable and the expected direction of the influence on the hypothesized variable on 
the marketing behaviour of cattle are specified in Table 1 below. It is further hypothesized 
that the same variable is expected to have the same directional influence on both 
investigations, i.e. the decision whether or not to sell through the formal markets and the 
decision on the proportion of cattle sold through the formal markets on condition that the 
producer has used the formal markets to sell his/her cattle.  8 
 
 
Table 1: Explanatory variables hypothesized to influence the marketing and the 
proportion decision of cattle in the NCRs 
 
Variables description          Variable Name            Measurement value           Expected sign 
      
Socio-economic characteristics    
Age of respondents  AGE  Age of the respondent (Number)
  +/- 
Marketing experience  EXPERIENCE  Number of years engaged in 
agricultural activities? (Number)
  + 
Information costs   
Lack of market experts  MRKEXP  How do you rate the accessibility 
of cattle marketing experts (1-5)
a  +/- 
Access to market related 
information 
MRKINF 
How easy/difficult to access 
market  related information (1-5)
b  - 
Access to government 
related information 
GOVINF 
How easy/difficult to access 




Access to new 
technology information 
NEWTECH 
How easy/difficult to access new 
technology  information (1-5)
b  +/- 
Market uncertainty  MRKUNCETY  Rank market access in order of 
importance as a constraint (1-5)
c  +/- 
Negotiation costs    
Transport problem to 
MeatCo 
PTRNSPMEATC 
Do you have a transport problem 
to MeatCo? (1-2)
d  - 
Transport cost   TRANSCOST 
How much do you pay to 




Buyer bargaining power  BUYERPOWER  Do you have bargaining power to 
influence selling price? (1-2)
d  - 
Payment arrangement   PAYMENT  Do you experience payment delay 
with MeatCo? (1-3)
f + 
Monitoring costs   
Price uncertainty  PRCEUNCETY 
Have you experienced problem 




Animal handling  HANDLING 
Have you experienced problem 




Grading uncertainty  GRDEUNCETY 
Rate age as a quality attributes 




Productivity uncertainty    
Improved productivity  IMPRODUCTY 
Have you experience higher 
animal productivity over last 5 
yrs? (1-2)
d  - 
Access to credit  CREDACCES  Rank in order of importance 
credit access as a constraint (1-5)
c   + 
a Possible answers were: 1= Very poor, 2= Poor, 3= Moderate, 4= Good, 5= Very good 
b Possible answers were: 1= Very easy, 2= Easy, 3= Moderate, 4= Difficult, 5= Very difficult 
c Possible answers were: 1 = Most important, 2= Important, 3= Moderate, 4= Not important, 5= Least important  
d Possible answers were: 1= yes, 2 = No 
e Possible answers were: In Namibian Dollar 
f Possible answers were: 1= Never, 2= Sometimes, 3= Always 9 
 
 
Following Magingxa et al, (2006) Principle Component Regression (PCR) is applied within 
maximum likelihood estimation framework. The correlation matrix C using both standardized 
and unstandardized variables were used to calculate the eigenvalues  k    ,... , 2 1    and 
corresponding eigenvectors  i   respectively in Equation 1 and 2: 
 
  |С–λΙ| = 0, |С–λjΙ|Vj = 0            (1) 
The eigenvectors Vj  were then arranged to give matrix V in Equation 2 
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     ( 2 )  
The matrix V is orthogonal as its columns satisfy the conditions  i i 
' = 1 and  i j 
'  = 0 for 
j i   
  Z = X
S V          (3) 
Where X
S is n×k matrix of standardized variables; V is eigenvector matrix as defined in 
Equation  3.  There are k explanatory variables as there are k  variables. The new sets of 
variables (explanatory variables) unlike the original variables are orthogonal i.e. they are 
uncorrelated.  
 
After the explanatory variables are calculated and explanatory variables with the smallest 
eigenvalues are eliminated Equation 4 was fitted to determine explanatory variables having 
significant impact on the probability of decision-making of whether or not to sell through the 
formal markets and the proportion of cattle sold through the formal markets: 
     P = F(       
s s s V V 0 )       (4) 
After insignificant explanatory variables from Equation 5  are identified and eliminated, 
Equation 5 is obtained in terms of the retained hypothesized variables. 
  P= F 
      
s
0           (5) 
where Z = V
s   and  =
s V   . Z is an n   matrix of retained explanatory variables, V is a 
k    
matrix of the eigenvectors corresponding to the retained components,  is     vector of 
coefficients associated with the variables. Standard errors of the estimated coefficients  are 
represented by an  1   vector. 
 10 
 
  Var(ˆ) =  











2 ˆ  is variance of residuals from Equation 4. Therefore standard error of γ may be 
given by  
        ˆ . . ... ˆ . . ˆ . . 2 1 e s e s e s k
s               (7) 
Results obtained using Equation 5 may be transformed back to the explanatory variable 
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(8) 
 
where  i ˆ  is estimator of  i   in Equation 6. The constant  y
s
EV  ,    .  
 
The standardized coefficients evaluate the relative importance of the explanatory variables in 
determining the marketing decision-making of cattle producers. Variance of the explanatory 
variables estimators in standardized variables is given by: 
  Var(
s
EV  ) = 




  contains the squares of the elements of V
s
l in Equation 2  and K
S contains the 
squares of the elements of the matrix of standard errors of the coefficient matrix of  in 
Equation 5. The corresponding standard errors for the estimators of explanatory variables of 
standardized variables are given by:  
             







EV                             (10)     
The transformed standardized coefficients 
s
EV j,    of standardized variables 
x
j   back to 
EV j,  unstandardized coefficients  EV j,   of  j   
 




































              (12)   11 
 
where  xj S is the standard deviation of the 








EV , , 2 , 1 , 0 , , ,      
are coefficients of the standardized variables.  
Partial effect of the continuous explanatory variables on marketing decision may be 
computed by the expression 
 









       
(13) 
 
where   ij
k
i




   
The “partial” effects of the discrete variables are calculated by taking the difference of the 
probabilities estimated when value of the variable is set to 1 and 0 1 , 0   i i x x  , 
respectively. 
 
The regressand in this objective is a binary variable that take only two values (1, 0), say, if a 
cattle producer has at least sold through the formal markets and 0 if never sold through the 
formal markets. Probit model was used to determine the factors that influence the decision of 
whether or not to sell through the formal markets (secondary objective 1). Estimates for the 
Probit model are developed by the method of maximum likelihood and it capitalizes on the 
assumed normality of the error term (Aldrich & Cnudde, 1975; Bertschek & Lechner, 1998). 
Following (Maddala, 2001) the following Probit model is estimated: 
We assume that we have a regression model 
  i ij
k
j





      
(18) 
where 
 i is not observed. It is commonly called a latent variable. What we observe is a 
dummy variable  i y defined by: 
   i y =           (19) 
    
If we multiply 
 i in Equation 19 by any positive constant, does not change yi. Hence if we 
observe  yi, we can estimate the β’s in Equation 18  only up to a positive multiple. It is 
customary to assume var(ui) = 1. From the relationship Equation 18 and 19 we get: 
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where F is the cumulative distribution function of u. if the distribution of u is symmetric, 
since  
1-F(-Z) = F(Z). The observed yi are just realizations of a binomial process, probabilities is 
given by:   













       
(21) 
Varying from trial to trial (depending on xij), we can write the likelihood function as 









       
(22) 
 We can write Equation (21) differently as given by (Katchova & Miranda, 2004). 
 
   P(ci = 1) = Φ(γ′zi)        (23) 
Where  ci  is the formal marketing-decision, Φ is the standard normal cumulative density 
function, zi is an R1 vector of personal and farm characteristics for farmer i, and γ′ is a 
vector of coefficients. It is assumed that the density of ci, conditional on being a non-limit 
(positive) observation, is that of N (Xtβ2, σ
2). 
 
Factors affecting decisions on proportion of cattle marketed through the formal markets on 
condition that a producer has used the formal markets to sell his/her cattle 
 
This specification relies on the potentially strong assumption that the discrete cattle producer 
choice to participate in the formal market is made simultaneously with the continuous choice 
as to the number of animals to sell conditional on having chosen to go through the formal 
market. The Truncated model on this analysis captures the characteristics that influence 
producer’s decisions on the proportion of cattle to sell through the formal markets 
(secondary objective 2). Following Katchova and Miranda, (2004), the Tobit model assumes 
that a latent variable 
*
i  is generated by: 
   i i i X        
*
        (24) 
Where Xi  is an S  1 vector of personal and farm characteristics for farm i,    is a vector of 




i  is negative, the variable that is actually observed, the proportion of cattle sold 
through formal markets,  i  , is zero. When 
*
i  is positive, 
*
i i    . In the Tobit model, the 
probability that the proportion of cattle sold through formal markets is zero is calculated by 
Equation 25: 









      
 (25) 
and the density for the positive values of αi is  13 
 



































        (26)   
where      is the standard normal probability density function. Equation 25 represents the 
adoption decision, and is a valid Probit model if considered separately from Equation 26. 
Equation  26 represents a Truncated regression for the positive values of the continuous 
decision of how much cattle to sell through the formal markets  0  i   as indicated by 
Peracchi (1987). The Tobit model arises when the decision-making, represented by the Probit 
model in Equation 26, and the decision of what proportion of cattle sold through the formal 
markets, represented by the Truncated regression model in Equation 26  have the same 
variables Xi and the same parameter vector   . In the Tobit model, a variable that increases 
probability of decision-making of whether or not to sell through the formal markets will also 
increase the mean number of cattle marketed through the formal markets (Katchova & 
Miranda, 2004).  
 
Using Equation 26, a Truncated regression is used to determine the proportion of cattle sold 
through the formal markets on condition that producer has used the formal markets to 
sell his/her cattle. The data used for this analysis were obtained from the matrix V in 
Equation 2; the same procedures were followed as specified from Equation 5 to Equation 12. 
Only cattle producer that indicated to have used the formal markets were included in this 
analysis. The use of a two-step model allows different variables to influence the decisions on 
whether or not to use formal markets, and the proportion of cattle sold through the formal 
markets. A variable can also influence these decisions in the same or opposite direction 
(Katchova & Miranda, 2004).  
 
Within a single decision-making framework the log-likelihood for the Tobit model consists of 
the probabilities of some farmers who did not sell any cattle through the formal market and a 
classical regression for the positive values of  i   





























0 0     
(27) 
Katchova and Miranda (2004) reveal that Cragg relaxed the assumption that the same 
variables and the same parameter vector affect both the decision-making of whether or not to 
sell through the formal market and the decision of what proportion of cattle to be sold 
through the formal markets. Following Katchova and Miranda, (2004) a hurdle model was 
used in which a farmer makes a two-step decision: 
  P(ci = 1) = Φ(γ′zi)          ( 2 8 )  14 
 
If the “impediment” is crossed, that is, the farmer has decided to sell through the formal 
market (ci=1), a Truncated regression (Equation 26) describes his choice of how much cattle 
production to sell through the formal markets (αi > 0). The log-likelihood in Cragg’s model is 
a sum of the log-likelihood of the Probit model (the first two terms) and the log-likelihood of 
the Truncated regression model (the second two terms), 
ln L =      


















































Testing the more restrictive Tobit model against the more general Cragg model, first and 
second conditions are stated as:  
H0: Tobit, with a log-likehood function given in Equation 27 
H1: Cragg’s model (Probit and Truncated regression estimated separately), with a log-likelihood 
function given in Equation 29 
Cragg’s model reduces to a Tobit model if Zi = Xi and γ = βα / σ. Given the first condition, the 
second condition is a testable restriction. Therefore, the Tobit model can be tested against 
Cragg’s model (Secondary objective 3) by estimating a Probit, a Truncated regression, and a 
Tobit model with the same variable (Xi) and computing the following likelihood ratio 
statistic: 
    = 2(ln LProbit + ln LTruncated regression – ln LTobit)       (30) 
where   is a chi-square distribution with R degrees of freedom (R is the number of 
independent variables including a constant). The Tobit model will be rejected in favour of 
Cragg’s model if  exceeds the appropriate chi-square critical value. 
 
5. Results and discussion 
 
The interpretation of the Probit coefficients differs from typical linear regressions (Bahta & 
Bauer, 2007). Thus requires more manipulation in order to calculate the impact of the 
independent variables on the probability to decide whether or not to sell through the formal 
markets (Bahta & Bauer, 2007). For the purpose of this study coefficients are only interpreted 
according to the direction of their influences on the marketing behaviour of cattle. The partial 
effects of individual variables thus are not calculated.  
 
Appendix  C shows six variables that are significant at 5%, 10% and 15%
5 level of 
significance. Interestingly two of the significant variables (transport cost and price 
uncertainty) have opposite sign. Although transport cost (p<0.10) sign does not make 
                                                            
5 Significance of variables at 15% was opted because the intention is just to identify significant factors that   
   influence the decision-making of whether or not to sell to formal markets.  
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economic sense, it may indicate that cattle producers make decisions to market to the formal 
market irrespective of whether transport cost is high or not. They may take such decision as 
they are obliged to sell when a need of money arise. Price uncertainty (p < 0.15) indicates a 
positive influence, making it blurred to justify the influence of Price uncertainty on the 
marketing behaviour of cattle in NCRs. Nonetheless, this may be an indication that cattle 
producers are not sensitive to the weight difference
6 of their cattle because the marketing 
patterns are driven more by income needs than by price movements.  
According to the magnitude of standard coefficients problem to transport cattle to MeatCo 
(p<0.10) has the biggest impact on the decision of whether or not to sell cattle through the 
formal markets. The study found that some producers in Omusati and North West of 
Oshikoto have to transport their animals over distances of more than 330 km. As a result 
livestock often loses weight during transportation. The situation is worsened by the poor road 
network from livestock production area as some places cannot be accessed by trucks. Trucks 
often get stranded while on the way, particularly during the rainy seasons. Most cattle posts 
are situated deep in the forests, with dense vegetation along single, narrow roads, fit for small 
vehicles only. In most cases trucks get stuck in hanging branches of trees along the road, 
causing massive damage to vehicles. Consequently, transportation costs is blatantly 
transferred on to the cattle producers. 
Improved productivity (p< 0.10) can influence negatively the decision-making of whether 
or not to sell through the formal market. Lack of improved productivity among animals in the 
NCRs is believed to discourage producers to market through the formal market. Possible 
reason could be that producers have high expectation to receive good returns when taking 
their cattle to the formal market without considering the productivity values of their cattle. 
After the cattle have been slaughtered and graded producers feel deceived, thus get 
demoralized to continue supplying cattle to MeatCo. Lack of production and marketing-
related information  (p<0.05) has been revealed to be a major constraint that needs 
immediate attention in the marketing behaviour of cattle farmers in the NCRs because it 
results in producers being unable to make mainstream market-related decisions
7. Unlike the 
above three factors, accessibility to new information technology (p<0.15) has a positive 
influence on the decision of whether or not to sell through the formal markets. Through the 
adoption of new livestock production technologies, producers use medicines to combat 
diseases and use improved management practices, which lead to reduced mortality rate and 
increased weight gain.  
The results of Truncated specification
8 are presented in Appendix D. Based on the results
9 
shown in Appendix D, six factors (age,  accessibility to new information technology, 
                                                            
6 This may be attributed to the limited access of resources as producers typically do not have scales to weigh  
   their animals before market. The differences in weight (weight of cattle at the production area and the weight  
   of cattle after delivered at the slaughtering plant) thus will not influence the decision because the initial weight  
   is unknown. 
7  Lack of information results in producers being unable to receive information for the purpose of adopting new   
   and relevant technologies at the right time. 
 
8 To attain the second secondary-objective of identifying factors influencing the proportion of cattle sold 16 
 
payment arrangement by MeatCo,  experience,  lack of  market experts and animal 
handling) have significantly influenced the proportion of cattle sold through the formal 
markets.  
It is doubtful having marketing experience (p<0.15) with opposite signs. The satisfaction of 
selling to the formal markets determines how an individual will be interested in that particular 
marketing channel. The lesser satisfaction, the fewer cattle a producer is willing to sell 
through that market channel. The way cattle producers view their farming businesses depends 
on their personal aspirations, objectives and goals. Thus producers’ decision-making 
regarding marketing is influenced by the relative importance they attach to their selling and 
producing roles. 
Given the standardized coefficients of the significant factors, payment arrangement by 
MeatCo (p<0.10) is having a significant influence in encouraging cattle producer to sell a 
large proportion of their cattle through the formal markets. Because of the quick payment 
process
10, producers are encouraged to increase the proportion of cattle as they are assured 
that they will get a lump sum of income shortly after their cattle are slaughtered. Influencing 
the proportion of cattle sold through the formal markets relates to animal handling (p<0.15); 
poor animal handling do not worry producers in taking their cattle to the formal markets. 
Instead, it encourages them to sell more animals; this may be attributed to a number of 
reasons
11. The influence of accessibility of new information technology (p<0.05) is 
negative which implies that although new technology can increase the number of animals as a 
herd, it does not necessarily increase cattle with the same qualities. Thus, producers only 
choose the best quality cattle to sell through the formal markets and discard the rest for home 
consumption or to the informal markets
12. Another possible reason could be that producers do 
not receive necessary technologies that improve qualities demanded by the market or they 
may not have enough information on the type of qualities that the market demand. Lack of 
market experts (p<0.15) has a negative influence, implies that lack of market experts may 
have a lethal effect on the functionality of the whole marketing system if the stakeholders in 
the system are un-informed. The inaccessibility of market experts indicates that cattle 
producers are locked out of relevant information and they are likely to make decision 
according to the only out-dated available information or little marketing experience they 
have. There is a relationship between the age (p<0.01) of the cattle producer and the herd size 
as the older cattle producers are likely to sell a large quantity of cattle at a time. In most 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
   through the formal markets conditional to the producer having used the formal markets Truncated model is    
   used. 
 
9 Similar to the Probit regression, the marginal effect of the independent variables is not calculated, the  
   coefficients will be interpreted only based on the direction of their influence on the dependent variable. 
 
10 MeatCo settle payment the following day after the slaughtering date. 
 
11 Firstly, hides has no benefits to producers as MeatCo does not grade, neither compensate, producers for hides 
    and offal. Secondly, producers are likely to get rid-off of bad-looking cattle first, should a cattle show bruises  
    or symptoms of sickness it becomes the first target to be sold out. 
 
12 Informal markets has no specified quality requirements or grading 17 
 
cases, good breed (hybrid) are found in their herds and this encourage them to sell through 
the formal markets as they are assured that their cattle meets the quality attributes that buyers 
consider when buying their cattle. 
The estimation results of the Probit, Truncated and Tobit specification are presented in 
Appendix  E
13. The inconsistence in the significance of factors across alternative 
specifications prompted us to consider testing the more restrictive Tobit model against the 
more general Cragg model. The three models are estimated with same variables and the log-
likelihood of the Tobit model is compared to the sum of those in the Probit and the Truncated 
regression models. The highly significant (p<0.000012) log-likelihood test ratio of 60.21 
strongly reject the Tobit model specification in favour of the more general Cragg model 
specification. This implies that the same personal and farm characteristics do not influence 
both the decision of whether or not to sell to the formal markets and the decision-making of 
the proportion of cattle sold through the formal markets in the same way through the 
restricted coefficients in the Tobit models.  
 
6. Conclusion and recommendation 
 
The study concluded that the provision of IT
14 is positively influencing the decision of 
whether or not to sell through the formal market. The development of feasible technical 
options that address producers’ priorities and a participatory extension system responsive to 
producers’ needs are critical to enhance the knowledge of producers and win their trust so 
that they may try new technologies introduced. 
The different factors identified by the Truncated and Probit analysis indicates that different 
factors must be considered when opting to influence marketing behaviour, i.e. when you 
advise producers to market their cattle through the formal markets and when you advise 
producers on the proportion of cattle to sell through the formal markets. 
Considering the results of this study and the conclusions drawn above, the following 
recommendations are made. It is assumed that improving on some factors will remove or 




13 Appendix E is not interpreted, rather the results of the three specified models are compared to each other to  
    determine the feasibility of testing whether it is sufficient to model the analysis as a single decision-making or  
    as a two decision-making. 
 
14 This indicates that effective introduction of livestock technologies must be clearly understood by producers to  
    improve feeding and management practices needed to uplift livestock production and marketing to another  
    level. 18 
 
 
  Transportation of cattle to the abattoir 
 
Transportation costs can be cut if producers from one production area are well organised by 
making use of the same transport to markets. By transporting in bulk they stand a better 
chance of getting good basic consent of economies of scale compared to transporting as 
individuals and in small quantities. 
 
  Strengthening producers’ bargaining power  
 
Efforts are needed to increase cattle producers’ bargaining power and specialisation in cattle 
farming. As producers become more specialised in beef cattle production, producers 
bargaining power will increase when dealing with buyers (Gong, 2007). Therefore producers 
are recommended to work collectively in the procurement of production inputs, managing all 
shared grazing land and infrastructure, obtaining all required production and marketing-
related information and collectively marketing their livestock.  
 
  Accessibility of IT and market-related information 
 
A gradual approach to disseminate new technologies with substantial capacity building 
support at the field level for their successful adoption, marketing development and 
information support, and development of private service providers in essential areas of 
livestock production and marketing for sustainable and effective livestock development are of 
prime importance. The development of training programmes for producers to assist them in 
improving their farm management skills, farming efficiency as well as correct usage and 
management of livestock veterinary technologies are hereby recommended. Educating cattle 
producers on the grading system will reduce transaction costs of some of the producers who 
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NCAs  1,039,309 44  25,895  1  774,195  38 
SCA  394,475 17  226,963 9  566,734 27 
TOTAL CA  1,433,784 61  252,858  10  1,340,929 65 
COMMERCIAL 
AREA 
950,176 39  2,407,394  90  720,474 35 
TOTAL 2,383,960  100  2,660,252  100  2,061,403  100 
NCAs= Northern Communal Areas, SCAs = Southern Communal Areas, CAs= Communal Area 








Figure 4: Marketing of total production of cattle - Numbers 




Regression results of Probit model of factors influencing probability to use formal 
market 
 
Variables Coefficient  Standard  error  T-value  Probabilities 
Constant 1.3488  0.2326 5.7982
*** 0.0000 
Age 0.0147  0.0144  1.0226  0.3099 
Experience -0.0042  0.0166  -0.2519  0.8016 
Lack of market experts  0.0974  0.1229  0.7929  0.4297 
Market related information  -0.3120  0.1339  -2.3298
** 0.0218
 
Government related info  -0.0302  0.0909  -0.3322  0.7404 
New tech. information  0.1873  0.1188  1.5766
S 0.1181
 
Market uncertainty  -0.0099  0.1652  -0.0599  0.9524 
Prob transport to MeatCo  -0.7808  0.4393  -1.7774
* 0.0785
 
Transport cost  0.0017  0.0010  1.6609
* 0.0999
 
Bargaining power by buyer  -0.0490 0.6599  -0.0742 0.9409 
Payment arrangements  -0.0230  0.2735  -0.0839  0.9333 
Price uncertainty  0.7545  0.5192  1.4533
S 0.1493
 
Animals handling  -0.2697  0.3096  -0.8709  0.3859 
Grading uncertainty  -0.2670  0.2218  -1.2038  0.2315 
Improved productivity  -0.72353 0.429611  -1.6842
*  0.0953 
Credit access  0.0456  0.1243  0.3670  0.7144 
Model summary 
 
No. of observations  121 
% of correct predictions  84% 
McFadden R
2a  0.2790 
Model chi-square
b  32.017 
Model significance  0.031 
N sellers  99 





 = 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively  
 
S = Significant at 15% level 
a = McFadden R
2 is given by one minus the ration of the unrestricted to restricted log likelihood function value 





                                                            APPENDIX D 
Regression results of Truncated model on the proportion of cattle market through the 
formal markets on condition that the producer used the formal markets to sell his/her 
cattle. 
 
  Truncated estimators 
Variables  Coefficient Standard  error  T-value  Prob 
Constant 0.3752  0.0170  22.0470
*** 0.0000 
Age  0.0041 0.0014  2.9559
*** 0.0039
Experience  -0.0022 0.0014  -1.5597
S 0.1219
Lack of market experts  -0.0199 0.0122  -1.6419
S 0.1037
Market related information  -0.0063 0.0144  -0.43517  0.6644 
Government related info  -0.0078 0.0097  -0.80718  0.4216 
New tech. information  -0.0259 0.0114  -2.2889
** 0.0242
Market uncertainty  -0.0128  0.0154  -0.8271  0.4101 
Prob transport to MeatCo  -0.0257 0.0391  -0.6566  0.5129 
Transport cost  0.0001 0.0001  0.9866  0.3262 
Bargaining power by buyer  -0.0336 0.5973  -0.5628  0.5749 
Payment arrangements  0.0456 0.0261  1.7434
* 0.0843
Price uncertainty  0.0053  0.0327 0.1632  0.8707 
Animals handling  0.0451  0.0285 1.5823
S 0.1167
Grading uncertainty  0.0049  0.0239 0.2022  0.8402 
Improved productivity  -0.0507 0.0424 -1.1955  0.2347 
Credit access  0.0047  0.0132 0.3584  0.7208 
Model summary        
No. of observations        121 
Sigma
a 









 = 1%, 5% , and 10% significance level respectively and Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
 
S = 15% significant level 





                                                                 APPENDIX E 








 Tobit  Probit  Truncated 
Dependent  
variable 
Proportion of cattle sold 
to formal markets 
Dummy = 1if used 
formal market 
Proportion of cattle 
sold to formal markets 















































































































































Model summary      









Log likelihood  -19.913  -41.356  51.546 
McFadden R
2b   0.2790   
Model Chi-square
c   32.017   
Model significant level    0.031   











= 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively and Numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors 
S = 15% significant level 
a = It represents the percent of variation in the dependent variable explained by the independent 
variables in the model 
b = McFadden R
2 is given by one minus the ration of the unrestricted to restricted log likelihood 
function value 
c= The chi-square test evaluates the null hypothesis that all coefficients (not including the constant) 
are jointly zero 
d = The likelihood ration test is given by λ = 2(ln LProbit + ln LTruncated regression - ln LTobit) 
e = Number in parentheses are associated with chi-square probabilities 
 